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JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURTS
OF ILLINOIS*
CECIL BRONSTONT

Any system is nothing more than a plan, be it simple or
comprehensive, devised to effect and facilitate the performance of certain actions, and it is explainable only in the light
of the reasons which prompt such actions. It is pertinent,
therefore, in the study of the Illinois judicial system of probate administration to inquire into the reasons for such administration and, in so doing, trace the origin and development of the underlying actions which give purpose to the
system. Further, since laws are rules of action which have
objectivity only in the peoples who submit to their governing
force, any sketch of the development of the system cannot
be entirely divorced from the society which has nurtured it.
In modern English and American practice, estates of decedents are settled under the immediate supervision of local,
and usually, county tribunals. The main purposes are:
That the personalty of the deceased be properly collected, preserved,
and [together with income and profits] duly accounted for; that his just
debts and the charges consequent upon his death and the administration
of his estate be paid and adjusted, with such discrimination only as the
law recognizes in case the assets should prove insufficient; that the immediate necessities of spouse and young children [if there be such surviving] be provided for as the statute may have directed; that the distribution and division of the residue or surplus of the estate be made
among such persons and in such provisions as the will of the deceased,
if there be one, otherwise the statute of distribution, may have prescribed.
The primary purpose of administration is to collect the assets and to pay
debts; and distribution is only an incident.'
* This is the first half of a thesis submitted by Mr. Bronston in connection with
the work of the Graduate School of Banking, American Bankers Association. The
balance will appear in the September, 1940, issue of the REvIEw.
t Member of the Illinois Bar; Assistant Secretary Trust Dept., Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company.
1 Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th ed., 1933) III, 1672, par.
1391. The law of inheritance and administration, as explained in Pollack and Maitland, The History of English Law (2d ed., 1911), II, 256, "seems to answer two
purposes, which can be distinguished, although in practice they are blended.
The dead man has left behind him a mass of things, and we must decide what
is to be done with them. But further, he has gone out of the world a creditor and a
debtor, and we find it desirable that his departure shall make as little difference
as may be to his debtors and creditors. Upon this foundation we build up our
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The foundations of Illinois law are in the common law
of England. True, the first settlements in the Illinois country
were French, but at the most, they numbered in population
only some 2,000 people, and, except for a gleam of the romance and chivalry of old France across the page of Illinois
history, a few oddly shaped land holdings, a few peculiar
titles to be fitted into a world of township surveys and AngloSaxon land laws, and a few names of places, it is vain to inquire as to results of the French regime.2 It ended in 1763,
when all that France had claimed east of the Mississippi
River, excepting New Orleans, was ceded to England.3 The
governmental authority of Great Britain over the Northwest
of
was relatively short lived; it terminated with the Treaty
4
country.
the
to
title
States
United
the
gave
1783 which
Seven of the original thirteen states had claims to the
western lands, founded on the terms of their colonial charters, but, fortunately, these claims were relinquished to the
confederation of states, permitting settlement of the region
to take place under the auspices of the federal government
for the benefit of the United States as a whole.5 The Northwest Ordinance of 17876 established a government for the
territory northwest of the Ohio and provided, among other
things, that not less than three, nor more than five states
might be established in the region. Illinois achieved statehood in 18187 after having been subject successively to government of the Northwest (1787), Indiana (1800),' and Illinois (1809)9 territories.
In the beginning all the colonies except New York and
Delaware were English and the English life and law was the
rule, or became so, when the foreign-planted colonies fell into
elaborate system of credit. Death is to make as little difference as may be to those
who have had dealings with him who has died, to those who have wronged him,
to those whom he has wronged."
2 Theodore Calvin Pease, The Story of Illinois (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.,
1925), Ch. I.
8 John Spencer Bassett, A Short History of the United States (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 129.
4 Ibid., p. 216.
5 Pease, op. cit., Ch. III; Bassett, op. cit., p. 231 et seq.
6 Ordinance of 1787, July 13, 1787; U. S. Rev. Stats., 2d ed., 1878, p. 13; Jones Ill.
Stats. Ann., vol. 1, p. 41.
7 Act of Congress, Enabling Act, April 18, 1818; Ordinance of Illinois accepting
Enabling Act, August 26, 1818.
8 Act of Congress, Creation of Indiana Territory, July 4, 1800.
9 Act of Congress, Creation of Illinois Territory, February 3, 1809.
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English hands. Subsequent colonial settlements included
substantial numbers of persons with other national origins,
notably German and Scotch-Irish, but the English influence
never waned."0
Bassett observes, "the best colonizers were native born
colonists . . . to . . . whom the forest was more attractive
than the farmsteads of the East,"" and the history of the
settlement of Illinois will not belie his words. It was a natural
consequence, then that the laws of Illinois should follow the
same English pattern of the seaboard states whence came
most of her people.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROBATE ADMINISTRATION

English System
The early history of probate lies outside England. 2
Blackstone points out the great antiquity of testaments, citing their use among the ancient Hebrews and in Athens, but
not in many other parts of Greece nor at all among the northern nations. 3 But the common law of England, as affected
by such statutes as were enacted prior to the settlement of
the American colonies, forms the basis for American
statutes concerning administration and of the law in American states insofar as it has not been supplanted by their own
statutes.
10 Bassett, op. cit., p. 145 et seq.
12 Pollack and Maitland, op. cit., II, 341.
11 Ibid., p. 147.
Is Cooley's Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (4th ed., 1899), 11,
490. From this circumstance wherein testaments were permitted in one nation
and not in another, and were subjected to as many different formalities and
restrictions as there were nations permitting their use, Blackstone concludes that
the right of making wills and disposing of property after death is a creature of
the civil state; and the sovereign power which gives the right may govern and
restrict its use or, indeed, take it away entirely. See also Blackstone, II, 12.
With reference to testamentary dispositions, it has been said, United States v.
Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41 L. Ed. 287 (1896): "Though the general
consent of the most enlightened nations has, from the earliest historical period,
recognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of their parents, we
know of no legal principle to prevent the legislature from taking away or limiting
the right of testamentary disposition or imposing such conditions upon its exercise
as it may deem conducive to public good." And in Illinois, it has been held,
"Rules of inheritance are the creatures of the municipal or civil law, and, except
as to rights already vested, may be changed and modified at pleasure . . . the
.Wunderle v.
legislature has power to change the course of descent....
40, 60, 33 N.E. 195 (1893).
Wunderle, 144 Ill.
This principle also forms the basis for inheritance taxation. Magoun v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank 170 U. S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037 (1898).
14 Woerner, The American Law of Administration (3rd ed. 1923), I, 475.
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There appears to have been no time in the recorded his-

tory of England when the power of bequeathing one's personal property, in part at least, did not exist. We are informed that by the common law, as it stood in the twelfth century,
a man's goods were to be divided into three equal parts: one
for his heirs or lineal descendants, another for his wife, with
the third being at his own disposal. If he died without a wife,
the division was by halves: one to his children, the other as
he wished; and, by the same token, if he died without children, his wife was to receive half and he could bequeath the
other. If he died with neither wife nor issue, he could dispose of the whole. This law was changed by imperceptible
degrees until Blackstone could write in the eighteenth century
that a testator might bequeath the whole of his goods and
chattels without limitations. I5
It further appears that before the Norman conquest lands
were devisable by will; but with the conquest came certain
restrictions so that for a long period thereafter no estate
greater than one for a term of years could be devised, except
in Kent and some other few districts. In the sixteenth century, while Henry VIII was on the throne, the devise was
liberated from its limitations when it was enacted that legally competent persons owning land in fee simple might by will
in writing devise to any person, except to bodies corporate,
two-thirds of their lands, or the whole thereof, depending
upon the type of tenure. In another hundred years the distinction between the tenures had been abolished so that at
the time of the American revolution the whole of one's lands,
except copyhold tenements,1 6 could be devised. 7
Intestacy, it would seem in the eleventh century and before, was merely accidental, s and in the two centuries which
followed it acquired an intense and holy horror in the minds
of men. Their abhorrence is explained by the historian on religious grounds:
15 Blackstone, op. cit., II, 492, 493.
16 Copyhold estates arose when lords of manors for a long period of time had
permitted their serfs and the children of their serfs to enjoy their possessions
without interruption, in a regular course of descent; the common law, of which
custom is the life, thereby gave them title as against the services to the lords.
Blackstone, op. cit., II, 95.
17 Blackstone, op. cit., II, 373 et seq.
18 Ibid., p. 493.
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. . . the man who dies intestate dies unconfessed, and the man who
dies unconfessed-it were better not to end the sentence; God's mercy
is infinite; but we cannot bury the intestate in consecrated soil. 19

Anciently, if a man died intestate, the king, through his
ministers, administered the goods of the decedent and distributed them in accordance with the practice of the day.
Later the crown directed that the intestate's goods should be
divided for the good of his soul and invested the prelates of
the church with this prerogative, on the apparent theory that
the churchmen were of better conscience than laymen and
knew best how to dispose of the property for the benefit of
the soul of the deceased. It seems to have followed as a
natural event that, since the ordinary of the church had the
disposition of the intestate's effects, the will of a decedent
should be proved to his satisfaction, his right of disposition of
the chattels being thereby superseded. 0 Thus was inaugurated the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over administration and
probate which was almost wholly peculiar to and prevailed
in England until 1858.
Students question if what we call the probate of a will
was known in England prior to the time when the jurisdiction
had been conceded to the church, 21 but it is stated definitely
that in the thirteenth century the law had become well settled
that the goods of the intestate were at the disposal of the
judge ordinary, 22 and by that time testamentary jurisdiction
belonged exclusively to the spiritual courts. 23 Fortunately,
the privileges enjoyed by the clergy constituted a special
grant under the law and were not a matter of ecclesiastical
right, for thereby abuses which sprang up could be corrected
by civil legislative action.
In the beginning of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction ownership of the goods of intestates became vested in the churchmen. They were accountable to no one but God and themselves, but the record would indicate that their god was, as
often as not, egoistic. At that time the third part of a man's
19 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., II, 356. The connotation of intestacy is further
shown by the authors: "Of the terrible Fawkes of Breaut6, it is written that he was
poisoned; that having gone to bed after supper, he was found dead, black, stinking
and intestate." Ibid., p. 358.
20 Blackstone, op. cit., II, 494.
21 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., II, 341. Blackstone, op. cit., III, 96.
22 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., II, 359.
23 Ibid., p. 341.
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estate was his to dispose of as he saw fit, and since, inherently, an intestate did not dispose of his third, the clergy appropriated it to themselves "in the name of the church and
the poor." This was done without the payment even of the
decedent's lawful debts, and, in an attempt to correct such
abuses, there was enacted a statute directing the ordinary to
pay the debts so far as his goods would extend. 4
But the residuum of the third after the payment of the
debt still remained in the possession of the ordinary for whatever use he might approve, and the abuses were not completely checked. Hence, a further statute followed,2 5 which
is of particular significance in that it marks the origin of
administrators. By it estates of intestates were directed to
be administered by the next of kin of the decedent under appointment by the ordinary.2 6 The administrator thus became
the officer of. the ordinary; a relationship similar to that
which an administrator bears to his probate court today.
Quite some time later the discretion of the ecclesiastical
judge was broadened, permitting him to appoint either the
widow or the next of kin, or both at his pleasure; and in the
case of two or more persons of the same degree of kindred
he might appoint whichever he pleased.2 7 The seventeenth
century saw the statutory directions 8 that all surplus of the
24 Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, c. 19 (1285).
Woerner, op. cit., I, 475.
Blackstone, op. cit., II, 495; Blackstone comments dryly that the payment of the
debts was "a use more truly pious than any requiem or mass" for the intestate's
soul.
25 31 Edw. III, c. 11 (1358).
26 Woerner, op. cit., I, 475; Blackstone, op. cit., II, 496. In Pollock and Maitland,
op. cit., II, 359, the authors report the earliest specimen of letters of administration to come to their attention was a document issued by a bishop of Durham in
1313 by which he addressed Margaret the widow of Robert Haunsard, knight, and
William and John Walworth: "Confiding in their fidelity he commits to them the
administration of the goods of Robert Haunsard, who has died intestate. They are
to exhibit a true inventory, to satisfy creditors, and to certify the Bishop's official
as to the names of the creditors and the amount of the debts. The residue, if any,
they are to divide into three parts, assigning one to the dead man, one to his
widow Margaret and one to the children 'according to the custom of the realm of
England.' The dead's part they are to distribute for the good of his soul in such
pious works as they shall think best according to God and good conscience, and
of their administration they are to render account to the bishop or his cornmissaries. The bairns' part they are to retain as curators and guardians until the children are of full age. If any one impleads the bishop concerning the goods, they are
to defend the action and keep the bishop indemnified."
27 21 Henry VIII, c. 5 (1538); Woerner, op. cit., I, 475; Blackstone, op. cit., II, 496.
28 22 and 23 Charles II, c. 10 (1673, 1674); 29 Charles II, c. 30 (1680); 1 James II,
c. 17 (1685).
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personal estate of an intestate should pass to the widow and
29
children, or to the next of kin.
Of the testamentary jurisdiction conferred upon the
church it is related that from the first there were "two distinct things: (i) competence to decide whether a will is
valid, whenever litigants raise that question; (ii) a procedure,
often a non-contentious procedure, for establishing once and
for all the validity of a will, which is implicated with a procedure for protecting the dead man's estate and compelling
his executors to do their duty." 0 Having established the will
before the "judge ordinary," the executors swore that they
would duly administer the estate, and they became bound to
exhibit an inventory of the goods and to account for their
dealings. Prior to 1300 a regular procedure seems to have
been developed for their control. If guilty of negligence or
misconduct the ordinary could set them aside and commit
the administration to others, but if the executors were acting
properly they could not be ousted."
The ecclesiastical jurisdiction seems never to have encompassed more than these three branches: the probate of
wills, 32 the granting of administrations, and the suing for
legacies.3 3 And within these branches the powers of the
courts were more restricted than the powers of modern probate courts with reference to the same subject matter. Very
early the question arose, "What debts owed by, or to, the
testator continue to be due after his death and who can sue
29 Alexander, Commentaries on the Law of Wills, (San Francisco: Bender-Moss
Co., 1918), III, 1834.
30 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., II, 341.
31 Ibid., p. 342.
32 The restrictions on the significance of the probate of wills in the ecclesiastical courts is to be seen in the description of the two modes of probate in England
set forth in the opinion in Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910). One
mode was ex parte, in common form; the other, inter partes, in solemn form.
"By the first method the will was taken before the judge of the proper court of
probate and proved by attesting witnesses without citing or giving notice to the
parties interested. When, however, it was proved under the second method it was
done upon the petition of proponent for a hearing and all persons having an
interest were cited to be present. The executor of a will proved in common forn
might, at any time within thirty years, be compelled by any person having an
interest therein to prove it in 'solemn form.' . . . The probate of the will was
held binding and could not be contested collaterally as to personalty, but . . . as
to real estate amounted to nothing. The devisee produced the will, and . . . [in
controversies as to devise of lands] had to prove it as any other paper, as well
as the capacity of the testator to devise, on every trial."
33 Blackstone, op. cit., III, 98; and the author remarks that the suing for
legacies was subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the lay courts.
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or be sued in respect to them?" In the struggle to determine
which forum should have jurisdiction of the question the
temporal courts won. 4 Later, the act which originated administrators placed such administrators on the same footing
as executors with regard to the settlement of claims, thereby
bringing them also into the lay courts in dealing with creditors or debtors of their decedents. 5 Thus it is not to be presumed that from the time churchmen were granted authority
over intestates' estates and assumed probate jurisdiction
that, thereafter, the ecclesiastical courts exercised all-inclusive powers with respect to the many questions arising in
the settlement of dead men's estates.
Woerner clearly distinguishes between the powers and
authorities of the ecclesiastical and the lay courts of the later
days as follows:
To some extent, the power to pass upon the accounts of executors and
administrators, if no trial of issues, either of fact or law, was necessary,
and to grant them a discharge after a true accounting, seems to have
been exercised by the ecclesiastical tribunals. But the trial of disputed
accounts, involving the testimony of witnesses, questions of devastavit,
liability to creditors, legatees, and distributees, the marshaling of assets, recourse to real estate for the payment of debts and legacies, etc.in short, the control over executors and administrators in every respect
not included in the probate of wills, appointlnent of administrators and
payment of legacies-was exclusively in the common-law and chancery

courts.36
It is to be seen, therefore, that by the time of the American Revolution the exclusive authorities of the church courts
had become little more than ministerial in nature. By the
time of the American Civil War their jurisdiction had been
abolished and a new court, called the court of probate, established. This court was given the authority to grant probate of wills and letters of administration, but the enacting
statute left to the sole jurisdiction of courts of chancery suits
for legacies, and suits for distribution. 7
American System
There is no one American system of probate. A general
pattern may be seen, but probate law and practice in the
34 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., I,

343 et seq.
36 Woerner, op. cit., I, 477.

35

Alexander, op. cit., I, 1834.

87

Probate Act of 1857, 20 and 21 Vic., c. 77.
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United States must, in the main, be studied with reference
to the judicial system and code of each particular 'state.
Therefore the national development of the subject can be
traced only in the broadest general terms and with the understanding that even such generalities may be subject to many
and minute qualifications.
In this one fundamental, however, are all the states identical: their judicial systems are, in outline at least, established by their respective constitutions. But the constitutional
provisions vary greatly; most importantly, perhaps, in that
the legislature may or may not be granted broad authorities
for the creation of courts and the definition of their jurisdiction; or the constitution itself may provide for the different
courts and prescribe their jurisdiction with little or no latitude
granted to the legislature, of its own motion, to alter the constitutional system.8
The colonial tribunals were modeled after those of England, but, with independence, the American states could and
did adapt the composition and powers of their courts to the
89
requirements and convenience of their peoples.
The chief distinction and, albeit, improvement of the
American probate courts as compared to the English was
that in most instances the American courts were invested
with the necessary jurisdiction and authority to supervise
completely the administration of decedents' estates. In their
powers were combined not only those of the spiritual courts
of England but also the powers possessed by the English
common-law and chancery courts insofar as such powers
were necessary to control the administration."
The first probate courts to be established in this country
after the Revolution were in Massachusetts in 178441 but in
many of the original and other early states probate jurisdiction was vested in the general county courts. Today in the
more sparsely settled states or even in thinly populated sections of some of the more populous states, probate functions
38 These dissimilarities have their ultimate effect in the ease with which the
judicial system may be revised to meet changing conditions, a legislative enactment, of course, being much less difficult to effect than a constitutional amendment.
40 Alexander, op. cit., III, 1837.
89 Woerner, op. cit., I, 477.
41 See Wales v. Willard, 2 Mass. 120 (1806).
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are exercised by the county or parish tribunals. As population grew, however, it became necessary to divide the work
of the courts, and new courts were created for the transaction
of such business as might pertain to the estates of the dead
and the guardianship of minors and incompetent persons.
Moreover, in many states there has also been delegated to
these courts the supervision of testamentary trusts, a jurisdiction historically and factually within the realm of equity
jurisprudence. These courts are variously known as Orphans',
42
Surrogate's, Prerogative, and Probate courts.
Probate jurisdiction in the United States is exercised in
simplicity. Costs and fees are relatively small. The mode of
procedure is ordinarily by simple petition which states the
few facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. Because of
the informality of the proceedings, parties often appear before the judge without legal counsel, the usual aspect of a probate courtroom in the rural counties being that of some ex43
ecutive office where business is summarily disposed of.
The procedure is in rem, and not inter partes among the
various claimants, so that jurisdiction of the persons of such
claimants is unnecessary. The res is the estate of the decedent in whose name and on behalf of whose estate proceedings have become needful." Both realty and personalty are
subject to the probate jurisdiction. 45 Certain of these generalties apply to Illinois; others do not.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROBATE ADMINISTRATION

Illinois-TerritorialSystem
From our present vantage point one might conceive that
the first enactment dealing with the establishment of government in a vast area destined to assume such an important
rank among the states as that of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
Michigan, and Wisconsin would commence in a grand manner setting forth the form and method of government. Or,
hearing so much today of the rights of man as opposed, presumably, to his rights in property, one might be excused for
thinking that the Congress of the day which saw the dawn of
democracy in America would certainly not begin such enact42
44

Schouler, op. cit., III, 1710.
Ibid., p. 1673.

43
45

Ibid., p. 1713.
Alexander, op. cit., III, 1837.
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ment with what is but a detail of the general law of property,
relating merely to its devolution. Quite to the contrary, however, the first working clause of the Ordinance for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio River 48 sets
forth the mode of descent and distribution of the estates of
intestate "resident and non-resident proprietors in the said
territory."4 Yet, perhaps this fact is not so queer. If settlers
were to venture into that wilderness territory it was doubtless important to them to know, in the event misfortune should
befall them, to whom would pass such property as they
might wrest from its dangers. Such reason is an absurdity,
of course, for the legislators must have had broader objects
in view; but, whatever the reason, there is the clause. At
the least, its primal placing is indicative of the importance
with which man regards the disposition of his property after
death; that core around which revolves the subject of this
paper.
Further, the same section of the ordinance set forth that
estates might be devised or bequeathed by wills in writing,
attested by three witnesses, "provided such wills be duly
proved . . . and be recorded within one year after proper
magistrates, courts, and registers shall be appointed for that
purpose .... "
The government of the territory was vested in a governor
and three judges, a majority of whom should adopt such laws
of the original states as might be necessary and report them
to Congress; such laws to be in force until the organization
of the general assembly,4 8 unless disapproved by Congress.4 9 A court was to be appointed consisting of the three
judges, who should have a common law jurisdiction; 50 and
to the inhabitants was warranted the "benefits ... of judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common
law. . .. "I
The governor and judges enacted more than twenty-five
laws from 1788 to 1792 but, since these were not adopted from
the laws of the original states as seemed to be the technical
46 Ordinance of 1787, enacted July 13, 1787, U. S. Rev. Stats., 2d Ed., 1878, p. 13;
Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 41.
48 The first assembly met in 1799.
47 Ibid., § 2.
49 Ordinance of 1787, enacted July 13, 1787, § 5.
51 Ibid., § 14, art. II.
50 Ibid., § 4.
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construction of the empowering provision in the ordinance,
there arose grave question as to their validity. Included in
52
the laws of 1788 was one establishing a court of probate,
one judge to be appointed in each county:
. . whose duty it shall be to take the proof of last wills and testaments
and to grant letters testamentary and letters of administration and to
do and perform every matter and thing that doth, or by law may appertain to the probate office, excepting the rendering definitive sentence
and final decrees....
*

It further directed that the judge should record last wills and
testaments; make entries of the granting of letters testamentary or of administration; and receive, put on file, and carefully preserve all bonds, inventories, accounts, and other
documents necessary to be preserved.
In 1795, because of the question of validity of the preceding statutes, a large number of laws were adopted from state
codes, principally from Pennsylvania. These included acts
for the establishment of orphans' courts, 5 for the settlement
of intestates' estates,5 4 for the probate of wills,5 concerning the order of paying debts of persons deceased, 5 concerning how husband and wife might convey their estates,5 7 all
from Pennsylvania statutes; and a law for the speedy assignment of dower,5 8 taken from the Massachusetts code.
In 1800 the first division of the Northwest was made. The
western part, including Indiana and Illinois, was called the
territory of Indiana, the government of which was to be in
all respects similar to that provided in the ordinance of
1787.59 Apparently the governor and judges of the new territory enforced the laws which had been already adopted by
the legislature of the whole Northwest, repealing some but
adding none. By 1807 the population warranted a legislature
and the general assembly then organized revised all of the
territorial laws, providing that those laws, so revised, altered and amended, should, with the laws passed at that session, be the only statute laws in force in the territory. 0
52 Pease, Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788-1809, (IMI. State Bar Ass'n.
Reprint), I, 9.
53 Ibid., p. 181.
54 Ibid., p. 188.
55 Ibid., p. 232.
56 Ibid., p. 237.
57 Ibid., p. 242.
58 Ibid., p. 244.
59 Act of Congress, May 7, 1800, 2 Stat. 58; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., VoL 1, p. 48.
60 "Laws of the Territory of Illinois 1809-11," Bulletin of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1906); prepared by Edmund J. James, edited by
Clarence W. Alvard, Introduction, p. x et seq.
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In 1809 the territory of Indiana was divided into two
parts, the western section becoming the territory of Illinois.
Here also the government was to be in all respects similar
to that provided in the ordinance of 178761 and the first act
of the governor and judges was to adopt the Indiana laws,
excepting those which were of local character.6 2 No substantial changes occurred in the substance of the statutory
law dealing with probate, administration, and the courts during the period Illinois was a territory, even after its general
assembly came into existence.
Illinois became a state of the Union on August 26, 1818,
when its constitutional convention adopted the Ordinance of
Illinois63 accepting the enabling act of congress6 4 for its admission, and adopted its first constitution. 5
State hood-System under First Constitution
From the standpoint of organic law and priority of time
reference should probably first be made to the provisions of
the constitution of 1818 pertinent to this study. However, this
constitution is now of little more than historic significance,
whereas a simple act passed by the first general assembly
gave expression to a fact of tremendous influence in Illinois
law, not only in that day, but also currently, and in all the
time between. Somewhat loosely we say Illinois is a common
law state. The act, 6 little changed and present in the stat61 Act of Congress, Feb. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 514; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 49.
62 "Laws of the Territory of Illinois" 1809-11, op. cit., p. 1. The resolution:
"13th June 1809
"This day Ninian Edwards, Governor of the Illinois Territory, Alexander Stuart
and Jesse B. Thomas, Judges in and over the territory aforesaid, met at the home
occupied by Mr. Thomas Cox in the town of Kaskaskia, and after mature deliberation, they hereby resolved as their opinion that the laws of Indiana Territory of
a general nature and not local to that Territory are still in force in this Territory
as they were previous to the first day of March last.
Ninian Edwards
Alexr. Stuart
Jesse B. Thomas"
63 Ordinance of Illinois, August 26, 1818; Laws of 1819; Appx., p. 21; Jones Ill.
Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 54.
64 Act of Congress, April 18, 1818. 3 Stat. 428; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 51.
65 Constitution of 1818, August 26, 1818; Laws of 1819, Appx., p. 1; Jones Ill.
Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 57.
66 Act of General Assembly of the State of Illinois, approved February 4, 1819,
L. 1819, p. 3. The original of this Act was an Act of the general convention of
delegates of the colony of Virginia in 1776; Collection of Acts and Ordinances,
Richmond, 1785, p. 37. The fourth year of James I began on March 24, 1606. In
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utes today,6 7 declared that the common law of England and
all statutes or acts of the British parliament made in aid of
the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King
James I, with certain exceptions, 8 and which are of a general nature and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule
of decision, and shall be considered of full force in Illinois
until repealed by legislative authority. The influence of all
that is incorporated into Illinois law by this act is by no
means unfelt in the branch dealing with the administration
of estates.
It may also be well at this point to direct attention to
the great similarity to that of England which will be noticed
in the Illinois system of administering decedents' estates,
from the first days of the state to the present. Of course, no
ecclesiastical courts will be found, but it will be seen that
their counterparts, at least in the earlier history of the state,
had little more than ministerial powers. And one may note
in the development of the system in what relative derogation
courts of probate have been held in the acknowledgment of
their jurisdiction and authority, how slowly has been the
broadening of their field of recognition and, indeed, how in
some respects in their evolution Illinois has lagged behind
many states comparable to her in point of economic development and wealth. If Illinois has been mistaken in declining
to invest this particular class of courts with full authority to
settle all questions in the administration of a decedent's affairs, including testamentary trusts, the fault, if fault it be,
is traceable to the adoption in the state of the English dual
system of courts, and the subsequent close adherence to it.
But the system has served well the English speaking world
for many centuries and even this particular thereof, although
regarded by some persons as imperfect, is not to be impugned lightly.
The constitution of 1818 vested the judicial power of the
state in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the
this year the charter of the London company, which settled Virginia, was granted.
(The act was embodied in the territorial laws of both Indiana and Illinois.)
67 Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., 27. 12.
68 The excepted statutes are given at length in 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 596 (Appendix B).
They consisted of acts against usury and the limitation of the recovery of costs

in personal actions on frivolous suits.
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general assembly should ordain and establish.69 This grant
of power enabled the legislature to provide properly for the
subsequent judicial system relating to probate and the settlement of estates.7 0
Probate jurisdiction was first lodged in the county commissioners' courts. 7' The clerks of such courts were authorized to take proofs of wills and to grant letters testamentary
and letters of administration, subject to the confirmation or
rejection of any of their acts by their courts. 72 The courts
were empowered to require accountings from administrators, decree and settle distributions thereby determined, and
to compel the administrators to observe and pay the same;
and, further, to hear and determine all causes touching any
legacy or bequest in any last will and testament, payable or
coming out of the personal estate of the testator and to decree and compel the payment thereof.7 '
By Act of February 10, 1821,74 there was established in
each county of the state a court of record to be styled "The
Court of Probate." These courts were to have:
...exclusive original jurisdiction of all matters and things relative to
the proof of last wills and testaments, the granting of letters of administration and letters testamentary; the settlement of all estates of which
any person has or may die seized....

All the powers relative to wills, administrations and estates,
with which the county commissioners' courts had been vested
were given to the courts of probate. They were to decide
upon both fact and law; and an appeal or writ of error was
to lie from the court of probate to the circuit court and from
the latter to the supreme court.
Within the next decade several further acts 75 were pass-

ed, which were of more or less importance, but the jurisdiction remained unchanged, except that in 1831 there was con89 Ill. Const. 1818, Art IV, § 1.

70 Upson v. Davis, 110 Ill. App. 375, 380, (1903), reversed in Davis v. Upson,
209 IMl. 206, 70 N.E. 602 (1904).
71 Laws 1819, p. 223.
72 Ibid., § 1.
73 Ibid., § 7.
74 Laws 1821, p. 119.
75 Laws 1823, p. 132, repealed provision making courts courts of record. Laws
1825, p. 87, re-established the courts as courts of records. Laws 1829, p. 37, repealed
the previous acts of 1821, 1823 and 1825, but re-established the courts as courts of
record on the same basis. This was in reality a revision and consolidation of the
previous acts.
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ferred upon the courts concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court in all cases, without regard to the amount in controversy, when an executor or administrator defended, and
76
must have been sued as such executor or administrator.
7
The courts of probate were abolished in 1837 by an act "
providing for the election of an additional justice of the
peace in each county, to be styled "by way of eminence and
distinction, 'Probate Justice of the Peace.' " Powers conferred upon this officer relative to probate affairs were: to
issue and grant letters of administration and letters testamentary and to repeal the same; to take probate of wills and
record the same; to determine the person or persons entitled
to letters of administration, or to letters testamentary; to
receive, file, and record inventories, appraisement bills, and
sale bills; to require executors and administrators to settle
their accounts, and to settle for the property in their hands,
for which the justice might issue citations and attachments
into every county in the state; and to do and to perform all
other acts of a ministerial character which the judges of probate were theretofore authorized to perform in their respective counties. They were also vested with all judicial powers
theretofore exercised by judges of probate. Proceedings under their ministerial powers might be made matters of record in the circuit court of the county for the purpose of certifying the same to be used as evidence in any foreign state
or territory, but proceedings in the exercise of their judicial
powers were required to be reported to the next term of the
circuit court of the county for approval, and, if approved,
such proceedings then became matters of record in such circuit court.
These same provisions were included in substance in
1845 in a revision of the statute. 78 This law was condemned
by bench and bar generally throughout the state, "on account
of the mongrel character bestowed upon the probate justice
'7
and the incongruities and anomalies of the act.
During the period of the first constitution, the courts of
76 Laws 1831, p. 191. This act also provided the judge of probate should keep
and preserve complete records of all wills, testaments and codicils, and the
probate thereof.
77 Laws 1837, p. 176.
78 Rev. Stat. 1845, Ch. 85.
79 Ayers v. Clinefelter, 20 li. 465 (1858).
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probate continued to exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever over
realty of a decedent although, of course, having exclusive
jurisdiction of his personalty. 0 . However, one step away
from the common law is to be seen in the provision in 1819
that the proof of a will before the court of probate should be
sufficient to pass title to real estate devised thereunder.
Theretofore the probate of a will had amounted to nothing
as to real estate,8 ' but in all controversies relating to devises the devisee had had to produce the will and prove it as
any other paper, as well as the capacity of the testator to
devise. This provision of the act of 1819 has its counterpart
in the current Probate Act reading as follows: "Every will
when admitted to probate . . . is effective to transfer the
real and personal estate of the testator devised and bequeathed therein."8
The Constitution of 1848
Under the Constitution of 184888 the judicial power of Illinois was vested in one supreme court, in circuit courts, in
county courts, and in justices of the peace.8 4 There was to
be in each county a court to be called a county court85 the
jurisdiction of which was to "extend to all probate and such
other jurisdiction as the General Assembly may confer in
civil cases."6
Pursuant to this provision, the law of February 12,
1849,8 7 was enacted, establishing county courts, to be vested "with all the powers and jurisdiction of the probate court
as now established by law,''8 and - note - conferring upon
such courts concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts in
applications for the sale of lands of deceased persons for the
payment of debts. The clerks of the courts were to perform
all ministerial duties theretofore performed by the probate
courts, but the following were to be considered as general
judicial powers: granting of letters testamentary or of letters
80 Ferguson v. Hunter, 7 Ill. (2 Gim.) 657 (1845).
81 See ante, note 32, p. 11; also Luther v. Luther, 122 IlM.558, 13 N.E. 166 (1887).
82 11. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 205.
83 Laws 1849, p. 3. Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. Vol. 1, p. 73.
84 Ibid., Art. V, § 1.
85 Ibid., Art. V, § 16.
86 Ibid., Art. V, § 18.
87 Laws 1849, p. 62.
88 The language in this act conferring jurisdiction is general, and reference must
be made to the Revised Statutes of 1845 to determine the powers and jurisdiction
referred to by the words "as now established by law."
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of administration, except to collect, and repealing the same;
allowing or disallowing claims; determining who were entitled to letters; requiring the settlement of estates; and
directing the issuing of citations and attachments.
In 1851 the county clerk was given power to grant letters
testamentary or of administration, and citations, while the
court was not in session, subject to the approval or disapproval of the court at its next term.8 9 The only significant
change of this period was the investment of the courts of probate with the power to decree the sale of real estate of a decedent for the payment of debts.
The Constitutionof 1870-Modern System
The present constitution of Illinois was adopted in 1870.90
By Article VI, Section 1, the judicial powers of the state are
vested, except as otherwise provided in the article, in one
supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, justices of the
peace, police magistrates, and in such courts as may be
created by law in and for cities and incorporated towns.9 1
Section 18 of this article provides that county courts shall
be courts of record, and shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, appointment of guardians and conservators, and settlements of their accounts, in all matters relating to apprentices, and in proceedings for the collection of taxes and assessments, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided
92
for by general law.
Section 2093 provides for the creation of probate courts,
as follows:
The general assembly may provide for the establishment of a probate court in each county having a population of over 50,000, and for the
election of a judge thereof, whose term of office shall be the same as
that of the county judge, and who shall be elected at the same time and
in the same manner. Said courts, when established, shall have original
jurisdiction 94 of all probate matters, the settlement of estates of de89 Laws 1851, p. 193.
90 Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., Vol. 1, p. 108.
91 Ibid., p. 351.
92 Ibid., p. 367. Under this provision the general assembly may, by a general
law, confer upon county courts any jurisdiction which may be deemed advisable.
In re Mortenson's Estate, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
93 Ibid., p. 370.
94 In convention the draft of Section 20 provided for "exclusive jurisdiction."
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ceased persons, the appointment of guardians and conservators, and
settlement of their accounts; in all matters relating to apprentices, and
in cases of the sales of real estate of deceased persons for the payment
5
of debts.

Thus probate jurisdiction was continued in county courts
but the legislature was empowered to create and establish a
distinctive probate court in each county having the requisite
population. The quite apparent reason of the framers of the
constitution in providing that the legislature might create
probate courts was to relieve the county courts of the business which would necessarily come to them with the increase
in population and the consequent increase in probate busi96
ness.

By act in force July 1, 1877, the legislature provided that
there should be established in each county of the state then
organized, or thereafter to be organized, having a population
of 100,000 or more, a probate court, to be a court of record
and to have the jurisdiction prescribed in Section 20 of Article VI of the Constitution, the language being almost verbatim. 97 County courts in counties wherein probate courts
should be established were directed to turn over to the probate court all probate records, files, books, and papers of
every kind relating to probate matters in such county courts,
the probate court to proceed to complete all unfinished business. Therefore, where established, the probate courts take
One delegate sought to change this to "exclusive original jurisdiction" but it was
amended to "original jurisdiction" on the argument of Mr. Hay in which he stated:
"There are . . . many instances in which a court of chancery has necessary
concurrent jurisdiction with probate courts, in matters of probate, which would
be effectually cut off by the use of this language. It is well known that there are
many cases in which the settlement of an estate becomes complicated with
equitable and conflicting questions that cannot be adjudicated in the county court
and it becomes a necessity to resort to a settlement of those questions in a court of
equity." Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. 2, p. 1467.
95 Only the final draft contained the phrase concerning the sale of real estate to
pay debts. By amendment in convention it was added, the reasons stated being the
desirability, in counties of such size as to require a probate court, that all questions relating to the estates of deceased persons shall be settled therein, and that
it would only place the probate court on that point on the same level with county
courts in the exercise of probate jurisdiction given to them. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1467.
This reasoning is somewhat inconsistent with the argument described in Note 94.
It would have been more apt if the delegate had suggested "as many questions
as possible" should be settled in the probate court.
96 Klokke v. Dodge, 103 Ill. 125 (1882); City of Moline v. C.B. & Q. R. Co., 262
Ill. 52, 104 N.E. 204 (1914).
97 Laws 1877, p. 79.
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over exclusively the probate functions from the county
courts. 98
The act was amended in 188199 by providing for probate
courts in counties having a population of 70,000 or more. In
1933100 the limitation was again changed, from 70,000 to ".....
a population of eighty-five thousand or more, and in counties
having a population of seventy thousand or more but less than
eighty-five thousand inhabitants which vote to establish or
continue such court." 0 1
In the revision of the statutes in 1874,102 county courts
were given probate jurisdiction similar to that later given to
probate courts by the act of 1877, with one most important
distinction. In defining the jurisdiction of county courts the
constitutional provision included "such other jurisdiction as
may be provided for by general law," which was also included
in the statute. Appearing as this provision does in constitution and statute, there seems always to be the possibility
that the legislature could, if it so desired, confer upon county
courts probate jurisdiction and powers that it cannot confer
upon probate courts. It would seem possible, therefore, subject to constitutional limitations, 103 for the legislature to
create an anomalous condition wherein county courts, in the
exercise of their probate functions, could have broader
powers and jurisdiction than probate courts; for, it is well
established that the powers and jurisdiction of probate courts
are definitely confined to the subjects specifically declared
in section 20 of article VI.1°4
However, this added jurisdictional provision for county
courts appears not to have been utilized and, thus, it seems
98 Klokke v. Dodge, 103 IMI. 125 (1882).

99 Laws 1881, p. 72.

100 Laws 1933, p. 458.

101 The establishment of a probate court is unauthorized until the county has

requisite population and the time has arrived for the election of its judge which
must be at the same time the county judge is elected. People ex rel. Herndon v.
Opel, 188 Ill. 194, 58 N.E. 996 (1900).
102 Revised Statutes 1874, p. 339.
103 IMl. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 29: "All laws relating to courts shall be general,
and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings
and practise of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law,
and the force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts,
severally, shall be uniform."
104 People ex rel. Otis v. Loomis, 96 Ill. 377 (1880); First State Bank of Steger v.
Chicago Title and Trust Co., 302 Ill. 77, 134 N.E. 46 (1922); In re Estate of Shanks,
282 IM. App. 1 (1935).
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that, under the law as it exists, the probate powers and jurisdiction of a county court, which powers are existent only in
those counties in which there is no probate court, are identical with the powers and jurisdiction of probate courts. Not
without some hesitation is this statement ventured, but, if it
be taken as a recital of what the legislature has done in conferring jurisdiction and not as what it is within the power of
the legislature to do, it is believed to represent a true and
proper statement of the present relative powers and jurisdiction of the two courts in the exercise of probate functions
within their respective spheres. Hereinafter, therefore, references to the extent of the powers, authorities and jurisdiction granted to the probate courts may be taken to include the
same for county courts in counties not having a probate
court. 105
Of the classes of jurisdiction limited to probate courts by
the constitution this paper is concerned with only three: all
probate matters; the settlement of estates of deceased persons; and the sale of real estate of deceased persons for the
payment of debts. The first two of these classes, at least,
are of wide extent. They encompass all and much more than
was embodied in the three branches of ecclesiastical jurisdiction-the probate of wills, the granting of administrations,
and the suing for legacies-which constitute but details of
probate matters and the settlement of estates. And the sale
of real estate to pay debts is a subject which has never been
within the purview of English courts of probate, either ecclesiastical or civil. The further purpose of this paper is to
explore the question of what details in the administration of
estates within these three constitutional limitations have been
properly conferred by the legislature upon probate courts.
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF ILLINOIS PROBATE COURTS I06
In General
In our theory of government, the legislature, in representation of the sovereign people, can perform any acts from
105 In the Probate Act, Art. I, § 1, par. 2, it is provided that, unless the context
requires otherwise, " 'probate court' includes the county court of any county not
having a probate court."
108 For an analysis of this subject see W. L. Schlegel, "Jurisdiction of the Illinois
Probate Courts," 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 169 (1939). Mr. Schlegel's article
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which it is not restrained by the federal or state constitutions,
and conversely, can perform no acts from which it is restrained." 7 Thus, where the jurisdiction" of a court is defined by the constitution, as is the case with the probate court
in Illinois, the legislature can by statute neither restrict nor
enlarge that jurisdiction.'
Apparently in recognition of this principle, the general
assembly, in the act of 1877 creating probate courts, adopted
in almost identical terms the language of the constitution.
Where the courts have acted under the provisions of this
statute its language is to be interpreted in order to determine
the validity of the courts' action."0 But there are other legislative acts-such as the Probate Act"'-authorizing specific
actions which the probate courts may perform, and the validity of the courts' conduct under such other statutory provisions is to be measured by the constitutionality of the specific provision in question." 2 This distinction, however, becomes academic, because in either case the language to be
construed is the same.
The constitutionality of the act of 1877 establishing probate courts in counties of 100,000 population or more, and the
amendatory act of 1881 extending the provisions to counties
of 70,000 or more, was raised in Knickerbocker v. The People
has been very helpful in the preparation of this chapter. There are no direct references to the article by way of notes, but in lieu thereof this general and, it is
intended, greater acknowledgment is made.
107 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed., 1927), I, 173 et seq. See also
James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (3d ed., 1895); Thorpe v. Rutland &
Burlington Rd. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 142: "The people .. . possess all legislative power
originally. They have committed this in the most general and unlimited manner
to the several state legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by
the Constitution of the United States or of the particular state in question."
108 State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720, 9 L. Ed. 1233
(1833): "Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in
controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power
over them; the question is, whether in the case before a court, their action is
judicial or extra judicial; with or without the authority of law to render a judgment
or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to
render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction; what shall be
adjudged the case, its judicial action, by hearing and determining it." Cited and
quoted with approval in People v. Seelye, 146 Ill. 189, 32 N.E. 458 (1892).
109 Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934); First State Bank of Stege
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 77, 134 N.E. 46 (1922).
110 Moore v. State Bank of Chicago, 291 Ill. 372, 126 N.E. 165 (1920).
111 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 151-501.
112 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
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ex Tel. Butz."' The acts were upheld notwithstanding that
there were counties in the state having populations of "fifty
thousand or more"-the constitutional provision-which were
excluded from the operation of either of the acts. The court
held that Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the rule of uniformity in respect to all laws relating to
courts, was not a limitation on the power of the legislature in
establishing probate courts. Rather, it said that the only effect intended to be given the prescription was to require all
laws relating to "the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all courts of the same class or
grade" to be general and uniform.
Being creatures of the statute and deriving their existence from the section of the constitution hereinbefore
referred to, probate courts possess only such powers as are
expressly conferred upon them by laws passed in pursuance
of the constitutional provision, or as are by implication necessary to carry out such powers.1 14 They are courts of limited
jurisdiction, but, while acting within the scope of their constitutional and statutory limitations, they have a general
jurisdiction of an unlimited extent over the particular class
of subjects within their sphere-but not special or inferior." 5
Therefore, when adjudicating upon the administration of estates, as liberal intendments will be granted in their favor as
will be extended to the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction; and it is not necessary that all the facts and circumstances which justify their action should appear affirmatively upon the face of a proceeding."0
115 102 Ill. 218 (1882); Meserve v. Delaney, 105 Ill. 53 (1882).
In re Estate of Lalla, 281 Ill. App. 124 (1935), affirmed 362 ID. 621, 1 N.E.
(2d) 50 (1936); Upson v. Davis, 110 IMI. App. 375, reversed, Davis v. Tipson, 209
Ill. 206, 70 N.E. 602 (1904); People v. Seelye, 146 IL 189, 132 N.E. 458 (1892).
115 Ford v. Ford, 117 Ill. App. 502 (1905). This distinction as between courts of
inferior and those of superior jurisdiction only goes to the question of the presumption which must obtain in favor of the jurisdiction of a court and the mode
by which want of it must be shown. That is, a court of superior jurisdiction,
proceeding within the general scope of its powers, is presumed, in a collateral
proceeding, to have had jurisdiction of the cause until the contrary appears,
but the facts which give an inferior court jurisdiction must appear on its record.
People v. Seelye, 146 Ill. 189, 32 N.E. 458 (1892).
116 Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Turner, 341 Ill. 101, 173 N.E. 52 (1930);
Balsewicz v. C. B. & Q. R.R. Co., 240 IIl. 238, 88 N.E. 734 (1909), reversing 144
Ill. App. 219 (1908); Housh v. People for use of Camp, 66 Ill. 178 (1872); Ford
v. Ford, 117 Il. App. 502 (1905).
114
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Further, within the scope of their statutory jurisdiction,
whenever the relief to be administered, the right to be enforced, or the defense of an action properly pending before them involves the application of equitable principles,
their powers are commensurate with the duties demanding
their exercise, whether legal or equitable. 117
JudicialDefinitions of the Constitutional Limitations on the
Legislature'sPower to GrantJurisdictionto Probate Courts
The two phrases, "all probate matters" and "the settlement of estates of deceased persons," are general in terminology and effect. That is, in analysis they are capable of being separated into many integral elements, and must be so
separated in any accurate and complete definition of their
meanings. In their broadness they are like the others of the
first four phrases designating the classes of jurisdiction to
which the constitution limits probate courts, and dissimilar
to the fifth and last phrase-that afterthought of the constitutional convention"18-conferring
jurisdiction in "sales of
real estate of deceased persons for the payment of debts."
The final phrase, alone of all the five, is narrow and specific
and of itself qualifies and completely defines its own meaning.
Interpretations of the first two phrases show an overlapping, a blending into each other; and the phrase "probate
matters" has, in fact, been said to "mean matters pertaining
to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.'119 The
term "probate," strictly used, means the proving of a will
before the officer or tribunal having jurisdiction to determine
its validity,' but in common usage it has come to be applied
to any of the incidents of administration. 121 The Illinois
courts, wisely no doubt, seem never to have attempted to circumscribe the meaning of "all probate matters" with a rigid
117 Chapman v. American Surety Co., 261 Ill.
594, 104 N.E. 247 (1914); Shepard
v. Speer, 140 li. 238, 29 N.E. 718 (1892).

118 See note 95 supra.
119

Frackelton v. Masters, 249 Ill. 30, 94 N.E. 124 (1911).

Blackstone, op. cit., II, 508; Research Hospital v. Continental Illinois Bank
and Trust Co., 352 Ill.510, 186 N.E. 170 (1933), in which the court said: "Jurisdiction to probate wills must mean jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
wills offered. Such power inheres in the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution." Schofield v. Thomas, 231 Ill. 114, 83 N.E. 121 (1907).
121 Dibble v. Winter, 247 IlM. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910).
120
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definition, but rather, have seemed to content themselves
with general statements such as, "the words were used in the
constitution in a broad and general sense,' 12 2 and "in their
3
commonly accepted meaning."'12
For example, in Winch v. Tobin,124 the court said:
We may suppose the terms, "all probate matters," in the constitution, to be used in their broadest and most general sense.

.

.

. The

constitution does not undertake to define all the particular powers which
courts may exercise. It marks out their general jurisdiction, and if, in
the bestowal by the legislature of any special power, there be not palpable incongruity with the constitution, the legislative will may be deferred to. We need not scan words with critical nicety to see whether,
in strict precision of language, the legislative definition of probate matters may have been accurate.

Still general, but somewhat more precise, is the definition
which has been given to "the settlement of estates." In the
case of In re Estate of Mortenson 25 the court said:
The settlement of an estate, in legal significance and common understanding, is the process by which letters testamentary or of administration are granted, assets collected, claims allowed, debts paid, real estate
sold if necessary for the payment of debts, and the property distributed to
1 26
those who are entitled to it by the laws of descent or by the will.

There are really fewer decisions than one might expect
in which the courts have said in so many words that certain
specific subjects are within or without the import of the constitutional phrases.
122 Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill.
520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
12s Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934).
124 107 Ill.
212 (1883). Going beyond the Illinois cases one finds this more
specific definition in Martinovich v. Mariscano, 137 Cal. 354, 70 P. 459 (1902):
The words as used in the constitution, vesting jurisdiction of matters of probate
in the superior court "include the ascertainment and determination of the persons who succeed -to the estate of a decedent, either as heir, devisee, or legatee,
as well as the amount or proportion of the estate to which each is entitled, and
also the construction or effect to be given to the language of a will; but do
not include a determination of claims against the heir or devisee for his portion
of the estate arising subsequent to the death of the ancestor, whether such
claim arises by virtue of his contract or in invitum; nor is the determination of
conflicting claims to the estate of an heir or devisee, or whether he has conveyed
or assigned his share of the estate, a 'matter of probate'."
125 248 Ill.
520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
126 Courts of other states have indicated that "the settlement of estates" is
the method by which the accounts of the executor or administrator are approved, Sellew's Appeal from Probate, 36 Conn. 186 (1869); Allen v. Dean, 148
Mass. 594, 20 N.E. 314 (1889); and that the phrase does not necessarily include
"distribution," In re Creighton, 12 Neb. 280, 11 N.W. 313 (1882).
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Among such cases was Newell v. Montgomery127 in which
the court decided that the legislature properly included as a
probate matter within the jurisdiction of the probate court
the authority to call before it, in selling real estate to pay
debts, all adverse claimants to the land and adjudicate upon
their rights before ordering a sale. The theory was that the
land could be sold more advantageously and with the expectation of realizing a better price after the interests of all
parties had been determined so that the purchaser might
know precisely the nature and extent of the interest for which
he was bidding.
As the case cited confirmed the power in probate courts
to quiet title to real estate sought to be sold for the payment
of debts, so also has been confirmed its power to remove
128
clouds from the title.
In the more recent case of Rosen v. Rosen, 2 9 the court
held that the sale of real estate to pay legacies which, by the
will, were made a charge upon such real estate, was a probate
matter and an incident to the settlement of an estate, as these
terms are used in the constitution. This was a direct appeal
to the supreme court from an order of the probate court of
Cook County vacating a former order of sale to pay legacies. The sole question involved was the constitutionality of
127 129 Ill. 58, 21 N.E. 508 (1889), as cited in In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill.
520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911). Until 1887 probate courts had no jurisdiction to quiet
title to real estate of a decedent which was being sold for the payment of debts.
Smith v. McConnell, 17 Ill. 135 (1855); Phelps v. Funkhouser, 39 Ill. 401 (1866);
Cutter v. Thompson, 51 Ill. 390 (1869); Gridley v. Watson, 53 Ill. 186 (1870);
Shoemate v. Lockridge, 53 IlM. 503 (1870); LeMoyne v. Quimby, 70 Ill. 399 (1873).
However, as shown by the decision in Newell v. Montgomery, this was for the
reason that the legislature had not by statute conferred such jurisdiction upon
probate courts, and was not because of any constitutional inhibitions. By Laws
1887, p. 3, the administration act was amended to provide that all persons
holding liens against the real estate, or any part thereof, or having or claiming
any interest therein, in possession or otherwise, should be made parties to the
proceeding to sell; that the practise in such cases should be the same as cases
in chancery, and that the probate court might settle and adjust all equities, and
all questions of priority, between all parties interested therein, and might also
investigate and determine all questions of conflicting or controverted titles arising
between any of the parties to such proceeding and might remove clouds from
the title to any real estate sought to be sold, and invest the purchasers with a
good and indefeasible title to the premises sold. See also Clayton v. Clayton,
250 Ill. 433, 95 N.E. 480 (1911).
128 Schottler v. Quinlan, 263 Ill. 637, 105 N.E. 710 (1914).
129 370 li. 173, 18 N.E. (2d) 218 (1938).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

Section 137 of the Administration Act, 130 which provided that
when it appeared that a legacy was a charge upon the real
estate and there was not sufficient personalty out of which
such legacy could properly be satisfied, the probate court
might, upon petition of the executor, order the sale of the real
estate. In holding the section of the act constitutional the
court said it is manifest that the estate could not be settled
until the real estate was sold for the purpose of paying the
legacies.
In other cases it has been held that the probate court has
sole original jurisdiction to probate wills, 3 ' and as an incident to the probating of wills the power to establish the existence of a lost will has been held to be within its exclusive
jurisdiction.'3 2 The same rule has been applied with regard
to the reformation of wills in cases of spoliation, whether innocent or fraudulent. 1 33 Also, where the circuit court, on
appeal, ordered a will probated, a petition by an heir over
whom jurisdiction had not been acquired, to set aside the probate for fraud and want of jurisdiction, was properly entertained by the probate court, and its power to set aside the
probate of the will was upheld.'
On the assumption that the payment of legacies is necessary to the settlement of estates the power of the probate
court to construe a will has been upheld as incident to the
payment of legacies. 135 Further, as incidental to jurisdiction
to settle and distribute the assets of a decedent, it has been
held that the probate court has power to determine the rights
and interests of an assignee of an heir of the decedent in such
heir's distributive share in the estate.'38
On the other hand, some boundary lines have been
drawn beyond which the jurisdiction of probate courts has
not been permitted to extend. In 1909 the legislature attempted to extend the jurisdiction of probate courts, and county
13o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 3, § 137, par. 139. The Probate Act in force January
1, 1940, attempts to enlarge further the use to which proceeds from sales of real
estate may be put by including "the payment of expenses of administration" as
well as claims and legacies. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 397.
1s' Oliver v. Oliver, 313 Ill. 612, 145 N.E. 123 (1924).
133 Ibid.
132 Mather v. Minard, 260 IlL 175, 102 N.E. 1062 (1913).
134 Schofield v. Thomas, 231 Ill. 114, 83 N.E. 121 (1907).
135 Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 IMI. 111, 88 N.E.
460 (1909).
136 People v. Rigdon, 204 I1. App. 309 (1917).
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courts having probate jurisdiction, to the supervision and
control of testamentary trusts, including appointment and
removal of trustees, the issuing of letters of trusteeship to
trustees, the fixing and approving of their bonds, and the settlement of their accounts. By this act the courts of probate
were to have and exercise full chancery powers.117 But the
supreme court said that the settlement of estates
has no relation to the management or execution of trusts, which are either
entirely independent of the administration of the estate by the executor
or administrator to the same extent that a devise of real estate is independent of such administration, or, if the trust is in the residue of property
committed to the executor, can only become operative after the settlement of the estate is completed and the trustee receives the property from
the executor;

and, therefore, even though the words "probate matters"
were used in the constitution in a broad and general sense
and the broadest meaning was given to them, nevertheless,
the supervision and control of testamentary trusts are not included in the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.1 3 8
Within the same year the supreme court also considered
the question of whether it could sustain this act as to county
courts and hold it invalid as to probate courts. It observed
that had the act been limited to county courts, the constitutional objections would not exist for the reason, as noted
hereinbefore, that the constitution authorizes the legislature
to confer upon county courts "such other jurisdiction as
may be provided for by general law." Because it is largely in
the centers of wealth and population that testamentary
trusts are created and administered, and it is in counties
of such character that probate courts are established, the
court concluded that one of the controlling purposes of the
act, if not the principal one, was to confer jurisdiction over
testamentary trusts upon probate courts. Since that part of
the act was invalid, but so essentially connected with the
rest of the act, the court declared the whole thereof to be
void.189
Another important case is that of Howard v. Swift," ' in
13T

Laws 1909, p. 175.

138 In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
139 Frackelton v. Masters, 249 Ill. 30, 94 N.E. 124 (1911).
140

356 IlL 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934).
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which a trustee in bankruptcy filed claim against a decedent's estate seeking to impose a liability founded upon the
alleged fraudulent and unlawful acts of the decedent while in
his lifetime acting as a director of the corporation which
became bankrupt. It was contended by the trustee that, under the constitution, the probate court has general jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate all claims that may be made
against the estate of a decedent, but the court held that the
commonly accepted meanings of the constitutional phrases
contemplate conferring upon probate courts jurisdiction only
over claims arising out of contracts, either express or implied, and not claims based on torts.
Further examples of such matters as have been held not
to be incident to the broadest meaning of the terms "all probate matters" and "settlement of estates" are the power to
reform a written instrument under seal or to declare a deed
absolute on its face, to be a mortgage; 4 ' the compulsion of
the completion of a bid by the highest bidder at the sale of a
decedent's realty for the payment of debts; 4 2 the foreclosure of a mortgage on a decedent's estate; 4 ' and the cancellation of a deed made by a legatee transferring his interest
in the real estate of the deceased to the administrator who,
in his individual capacity, has obtained the deed through
1 44
fraud.
Attention has already been drawn to the narrow and
specific phrasing of the final class of jurisdiction, "sales of
real estate of deceased persons for the payment of debts,"
and to the fact that the clause was an afterthought of the
constitutional convention. And it will be recalled that prior to
the act of 1849 applications for the sale of lands of deceased
persons for the payment of debts could be directed to the
circuit courts only, and that that act conferred concurrent
jurisdiction of the subject upon the county courts-the then
courts of probate.
In 1849 the constitutional provisions relating to the courts
of probate were broader than the current provisions, but
there was, of. course, necessity for specific legislative action
141 Rook v. Rook, 111 Ill. App. 398 (1903).

Hannah v. Meinshaussen, 299 Ill. 525, 132 N.E. 820 (1921).
People ex rel. Otis v. Loomis, 96 Ill. 377 (1880).
144 Dowdall v. Cannedy, 32 111. App. 207 (1889).
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143

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS OF ILLINOIS

if such courts were to exercise jurisdiction in the sale of
real estate to pay debts. This is borne out by an opinion rendered in 1829 by Chief Justice John Marshall, in which he
said:
"Jurisdiction of all probate and testamentary matters, " [given by
the constitution of Ohio to the court of common pleas] may be completely exercised without possessing the power to order the sale of the
lands of an intestate. Such jurisdiction does not appear . . . to be iden145
tical with that power, or to comprehend it.

Modern decisions of the Illinois courts speak in direct
contradiction to the principle stated by Chief Justice Marshall. In them no attempt is made to rationalize the contradiction and, indeed, since no references are made to the
earlier case, the contradiction may have developed unwittingly. In any event, in these decisions the courts declare
that sale of real estate for the payment of debts is embodied
in probate matters and the settlement of estates. In People
ex rel. Otis v. Loomis 146 the court said that the jurisdiction of
the probate court embraces four subjects, naming the first
as all probate matters, embracing settlement of estates of
deceased persons, and sale of their real estate to pay their
debts. And in the most specific definition which has been rendered in Illinois as to the phrase "the settlement of estates,"
the court included as a part thereof the sale of real estate, if
14 7
necessary, for the payments of debts.
The authority of probate courts to adjudicate the rights
of all claimants to land being sold for the payment of debts
as confirmed in Newell v. Montgomery 48 and Schottler v.
Quinlan4 ' seems at first glance to be an extension of the
powers granted under this constitutional phrase, but, as has
been related, the jurisdiction of the probate courts was affirmed as a probate matter and as incident to the settlement
of an estate.
One may well wonder if the supreme court has not now
by its definitions of "all probate matters" and "the settlement of estates" so widened the scope of jurisdiction of pro145

The Bank of Hamilton v. The Lessee of Dudley, 2 Pet. 492, 524; 7 L. Ed.

496 (1829).
146 96 Ill.377 (1880).
147
148

In re Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
149 263 Ill. 637, 105 N.E. 710 (1914).
129 IM. 58, 21 N.E. 508 (1889).
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bate courts as to render quite superfluous the phrase relating
to the sale of real estate to pay debts. The decisions referred
to above point in that direction but the Rosen decision, 15 0 by
analogy, would seem to give support to this view. There, disregarding intentionally or otherwise the doctrine expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, with its implication that the express inclusion in the constitution of jurisdiction in sales of
real estate to pay debts excludes the sale of realty for any
other purposes, the court held, as has been previously stated,
that the sale of realty to pay legacies is incident to "the settlement of estates."
Is it not a fair inference that in the settlement of an estate the necessity for the sale of real estate to pay debts is
equal to the necessity for the sale of real estate to pay legacies? As a matter of fact, is not a sale to pay debts the more
important of the two? Such a conclusion would seem warranted in the light of Woerner's summary that the primary
purpose of administration is to collect the assets and to pay
debts, whereas distribution, in which category falls the payment of legacies, is only incidental to administration. 151
The grant of jurisdiction in sales of realty to pay debts
has doubtless served as a means without which the supreme
court probably would not have reached its present viewpoint,
but from the position of that high court today it is not an unjustified inference that support for jurisdiction of probate
courts on this subject, as well as all others affirmed to date,
is amply found in the phrases "all probate matters" and
"the settlement of estates of deceased persons."
150 370 IMI.173, 18 N.E. (2d) 218 (1938).

151 Woerner, op. cit., 1, 2.

